We examine search algorithms in games with incomplete information. We proceed by adopting the standard game theoretic framework of zero-sum two-player games, introducing a reduced form of incomplete information games in which equilibrium point strategies can be identi ed, and giving an algorithm that nds such strategies. We apply our formalisation to the game of Bridge, for which the reduced form corresponds to the typical model analysed in expert texts. In particular, we examine search algorithms for Bridge that have been proposed by other researchers, countering the optimistic suggestion that the incomplete information in the game can be tackled by an algorithm which considers some statistically signi cant subset of the possible worlds (card distributions). We use our model to pinpoint why, both in theory and practice, such approaches must lead to suboptimal performance and we generalise the reasons for this failure into two speci c and distinct problems. We illustrate these problems and our solution with simple game trees and with actual play situations from Bridge itself.
Introduction
We examine the problem of choosing a strategy in two-player games with incomplete information. Our formalisation is based on the introduction of incomplete information into the standard framework of strategy optimisation for zero-sum two-player games Nash 51] . To aid analysis of actual games, we formalise a particular reduced model of a game which corresponds to the often-made assumption of playing against a rational, informed opponent. We show for such games that an equilibrium point for the two players' strategies is well-de ned, and we describe an algorithm which we call exhaustive strategy minimisation that identi es such equilibrium points. This algorithm formalises the idea of selecting a strategy directly, by explicitly enumerating the possibilities, computing the minimum payo of each, and then selecting the strategy with the best payo . By explicitly manipulating strategies, our algorithm has di erent properties from standard minimaxing and produces more accurate results than adaptations of minimaxing (discussed below) to domains with incomplete information.
Our interest in this problem arose from our own work in designing a system to play Bridge Frank et al 92] and the realisation that standard search algorithms, such as minimaxing, could not be employed to nd optimal strategies in this domain. Search problems, both theoretical and practical, arise in Bridge because information is incomplete. That is, the players lack knowledge about the actual`state of the world' | for example, which opponents have which cards. Yet the e ects of incomplete knowledge on search in this domain are typically either not addressed or are mis-analysed in the literature on computer Bridge. Perhaps because of this, Bridge card play itself has proven to be a surprisingly di cult task to automate: a history of academic research Carley 62, Napjus 69, Stanier 76, Lustig 85, Gamback et al 91, Frank et al 92, Kibler & Schwamb 92, Nygate & Sterling 93, Smith & Nau 93 ] and a proliferation of more than two dozen commercialsoftware packages Throop 83, Lee 94], has failed to produce solutions or systems capable of competing with even good novice human players Geake 92, Manley 94] .
The common approaches to automating Bridge card play involve reducing the search space by either considering independently the sub-problems of the card combinations in individual suits ( rst suggested in Berlin 85]), or by removing the uncertainty over incomplete information altogether and considering instead the problem of nding the best strategy when all the players reveal their cards to each other Berlekamp 63, Wheen 89] . The latter of these approaches has prompted some researchers, for example Levy Levy 89] and Ginsberg Ginsberg 95] , to suggest Bridge-playing architectures that work by examining a statistically signi cant number of the worlds that are consistent with a player's knowledge. They speculate that in any given situation the use of search reduction techniques (such as alpha-beta pruning) would enable the minimax value of each possible action to be established in each of these randomly generated sub-problems, and the best overall action to be predicted by suitably combining these values.
We use our formalisation to show that, even in very simple incomplete information games, algorithms like those suggested by Levy and Ginsberg can yield suboptimal results. In particular, we identify two serious problems which a ict such algorithms, independently of how many worlds are considered. The rst, which we name strategy mixing, a ects any algorithm which attempts to combine together strategies for particular worlds to produce an optimal strategy across all (or some statistically signi cant subset) of worlds. The aw in this approach occurs because of the property of incomplete information games that the exact state of the world at any given point of the play may not be known to a player. This fact imposes a constraint on a player's strategy that he must behave the same way in all possible worlds at such points; a constraint which is typically broken when combining together strategies designed for individual worlds.
The second problem, which we name non-locality, arises when the players of a game have di ering information on the possible worlds. An opponent with knowledge of the likely possible worlds can use this to his advantage. In particular, he can direct play towards the portions of the tree of possible moves which are most favourable in the worlds he expects. Thus, some positions in the game may never be reached under particular worlds (as the opponent may always nd better alternatives). In general, determining which nodes in the search space will be reached under which worlds requires examining the entire tree of possibilities (since each move an opponent makes gives him the chance to select di erent portions of the tree in di erent worlds). Tree search algorithms, however, are generally`compositional', in the sense that they determine the best play at an internal node of a search space by analysing only the subtree of that node. Such algorithms (e.g., minimaxing) will not take into account the possibility that under some worlds the play may never actually reach that node. As in strategy mixing, the problem here is one of handling the notion of strategy incorrectly. By just evaluating subtrees, such algorithms consider only partial strategies; the complete strategies for the entire game would also have to specify what actions would have been taken in all other nodes outside the subtree.
We show that in incomplete information games, both strategy mixing and non-locality can lead to sub-optimal performance, illustrating our arguments using simple game trees and with actual play situations from Bridge itself. In the context of Bridge, we also show that our model corresponds closely to the form of the game typically analysed in expert texts, thus raising serious questions about the possibility of achieving true expert-level Bridge with the type of architecture suggested by Levy and Ginsberg. We proceed as follows. In x2 we introduce preliminary concepts from game theory and apply these in x3 to games with incomplete information; in particular we show how Bridge can be analysed within this framework by introducing a reduced form of such games. In x4 we present a general algorithm which nds optimal strategies in reduced games. In the second half of the paper we consider Bridge in some detail: in x5 we present proposed architectures for Bridge card play based on the minimax algorithm, and in x6 and x7 we use our game theoretic framework to identify why such architectures must yield suboptimal results. Afterwards, we draw conclusions.
Game Theory Background
In this section we introduce de nitions and terminology necessary to make the paper self-contained. This is based largely on the work of von Neumann & Morgenstern 44] and Luce & Rai a 57].
The Extensive and the Normal Forms of 2-player Games
In its extensive form, a game is a nite tree in which each node corresponds to a move where a selection between the branches is made. Each node is identi ed as being either a personal move or a chance move. Personal moves are made freely by one of the players, creatively named`1' and`2', since we will consider only two-player games. Chance moves are decided by some mechanical device (e.g., the shu ing of a pack of cards, or the tossing of a coin) that selects a branch in accordance with de nite probabilities. There is one distinguished node which represents the start of the game, and a play, , of the game involves starting at this node and allowing each of the players (or chance) to choose a branch until a leaf node of the tree is reached. The value that each player i attaches to the outcome of a play , (i.e., a leaf of the tree), is given by a numerical utility function K i ( ). This value is sometimes also called the payo and K i a payo function.
One complication is that at any particular move a player may not have full knowledge of the choices made prior to that point in the play. For example, in many card games the play begins with the shu ing and dealing of a pack of cards into hands, which are not visible to all players. Also, the outcome of personal moves may be hidden from other player(s), such as when a card is played face down. At any move, then, it is possible that a player will be unsure of the actual position of the play within the game tree. To precisely formalise the extensive form of a game, therefore, requires the nodes of the tree to be partitioned into sets of nodes between which a player will not be able to distinguish. We will follow Luce & Rai a 57] in referring to these sets as information sets. We will also model our actual de nition on that of Luce & Rai a 57, pages 39{51], requiring the speci cation of a 2-player game in extensive form to include the following:
A nite tree, t, with a distinguished node (the rst move in the game).
A partition, P(n), of the nodes, n, of the tree into three sets. These sets tell which of the two players (1 or 2) or chance (0) selects the next move at each node. A probability distribution over the branches of each chance move, de ned by assigning a probability (n) to each daughter of a chance node.
A re nement of the player partitions into information sets, I i (n), for each player i. Each node, n, at which P(n) = i is classi ed by I i (n) into one of the sets of nodes (numbered as integers 1; 2; ) between which player i will not be able to distinguish. An identi cation of corresponding branches for each of the moves in each of the information sets. (Since a player cannot distinguish between nodes in an information set, the possible moves will appear the same to him at each node of a set. When constructing the tree representation of the extensive form, we must therefore indicate which branch at each node of an information set corresponds to the` rst' possible move, the`second' possible move, and so on. In our diagrams, we will assume that this identi cation is in simple left-right order.) For each player, i, a numerical utility function, K i , de ned over the set of end points of the game tree. Figure 1 gives an example of the extensive form of a two-player game that starts with a chance move (represented by a diamond). This move has ve possible outcomes, and is followed by a personal move of one of the players (represented by a circle). The information set for this player, whatever the outcome of the rst chance move, contains only one node, i.e., there is no ambiguity over his actual position in the game tree. This means that the outcome of the initial chance is known to him. For the second player's moves (represented by squares), however, there are two information sets. This is because he is only aware of the outcome of the previous player's move, and not of the outcome of the initial chance move. The payo he will receive (represented by the numbers at the leaf nodes) therefore depends on information which is not known to him. Most games will be represented by a game tree that is too large to enable the extensive form to be given in practice. In order to facilitate mathematical analysis it is therefore common to work instead with an equivalent formalisation called the normal form. This formalisation forces each player, before the game starts, to state in advance what choices they would make in any situation that could possibly arise during the course of the game. Such a speci cation forms a strategy. Given the extensive form of a game, an easy way to formulate the possible strategies for each player is to assign a number 1; ; r, to each branch stemming from a node with r branches. A strategy for a player with q information sets can then be represented by a q-tuple in which each element corresponds to the move to be made in one of the sets. Utilising this notion of strategy, a 2-person game in normal form is de ned by specifying: two strategy spaces X 1 and X 2 , which are the respective sets from which the two players can choose their strategy, and two real-valued payo functions K 1 (x 1 ; x 2 ) and K 2 (x 1 ; x 2 ) which give the utility for each player when strategy x i is selected by player i. If there are no chance moves in the game, then a given strategy selection (x 1 ;x 2 ) determines a unique play of the game, , and we can de ne K i (x 1 ;x 2 ) = K i ( ). If the game contains chance moves then (x 1 ;x 2 ) instead impose a probability distribution over all the possible plays. If we use prob( ) to denote the probability of play occurring when (x 1 ;x 2 ) are chosen, the payo for each player is expressed in terms of the mathematical expectation K i (x 1 ;x 2 ) = P prob( )K i ( ).
Formulated in this way, the course of a single play of a game rst involves the choice of a strategy by each player. In non-cooperative games, this choice is made without any pre-play communication between the players. The basic theory of non-cooperative games is based of the concept of an equilibrium point, due to J. Nash Nash 51] . This views any selection of strategies by each player as being a`solution' to a game whenever no single player can individually increase his payo , or expected payo , by changing his strategy selection. That is, a pair (x 1 ;x 2 ) is an equilibrium point if the following hold. K 1 (x 1 ;x 2 ) K 1 (x 1 ;x 2 ) 8x 1 2 X 1 K 2 (x 1 ;x 2 ) K 2 (x 1 ; x 2 ) 8x 2 2 X 2 (1) A special case, relevant to our domain, is that of zero-sum games, where K 1 (x 1 ; x 2 )+K 2 (x 1 ; x 2 ) = 0, for all x 1 2 X 1 ; x 2 2 X 2 . Under this condition, we can arbitrarily select a K i (we choose K 1 ) and rewrite (1) as K 1 (x 1 ;x 2 ) K 1 (x 1 ;x 2 ) K 1 (x 1 ; x 2 ); 8x 1 2 X 1 ; x 2 2 X 2 :
(2) This states that K 1 has a saddle point; we consider next when this holds.
Minorant and Majorant Games: The Minimax Theorem
Let ? represent a non-cooperative, zero-sum, two-player game where the players pick their strategies without knowledge of that of their opponent. To analyse such games, von Neumann and Morgenstern introduce two variations on ?. The rst of these, ? 1 , is de ned so that it agrees with ? in every detail except that player 1 must choose x 1 before 2 chooses x 2 , so that 2 makes his choice in full knowledge of the particular x 1 decided on by 1. Since 1 is at a disadvantage in this game compared to his position in the original game, ? 1 is termed the minorant game of ?. The second variation, ? 2 , is the dual whereby 2 chooses his strategy rst; this game is termed the majorant game of ?.
For these new games, ? 1 and ? 2 , the identi cation of the optimal strategy is simpli ed, as thè best way of playing' may be given a clear meaning. Let us consider the minorant game ? 1 , in which 1 is the rst to select a strategy. For any particular selection,x 1 , 2 will choose an x 2 to minimise the value of K 1 (x 1 ; x 2 ). Thus, when 1 is choosing an x 1 he can be sure (assuming a competent opponent) that the expected outcome of the game is min x2 K 1 (x 1 ; x 2 ). This formula is a function of x 1 alone, and since 1 is attempting to maximise his payo , the best expected outcome he will therefore be able to achieve is v 1 = max x1 min x2 K 1 (x 1 ; x 2 ) :
A similar argument shows that if both players play the majorant game well, the resulting payo that can be expected by 1 is v 2 = min x2 max x1 K 1 (x 1 ; x 2 ) :
Von Neumann and Morgenstern show that these values can be used to establish upper and lower bounds on the value, v, that 1 can hope for from a play of ? itself. This result is then re ned to produce a theorem that states that there is a subclass of zero-sum two-player games (those with perfect information) for which v 1 = v = v 2 . This is equivalent to writing max x1 min x2 K 1 (x 1 ; x 2 ) = min x2 max x1 K 1 (x 1 ; x 2 )
which is in turn logically equivalent to (2) (i.e., it states that K 1 must have a saddle point). The form of (3) has led Von Neumann and Morgenstern's result to be referred to as the minimax theorem and it forms the basis of the well-known minimax algorithm suggested by Shannon Shannon 50].
Pure and Mixed Strategies
The minimax theorem does not hold for all two-player games. To achieve an existence theorem for general games, Von Neumann and Morgenstern extend the notion of strategy as follows. If the sizes of the sets X 1 and X 2 are m and n respectively, the players, rather than choosing an x 1 and an x 2 from these sets, instead specify vectorsp = (p 1 ; ; p m ) andq = (q 1 ; ; q n ) (p i ; q i 0; P p i = 1; P q i = 1) where p i gives the probability that 1 will select the ith member of X 1 as his strategy and q i is the probability that 2 will select the ith member of X 2 . When the players select their strategies in this probabilistic manner, the natural interpretation of the expected outcome is the mathematical expectation
As in the previous section, it is possible to show that for this augmented game, the function K has a saddle point. This is a probability theoretic interpretation of the previous saddle point theorem, and illustrates that in some games there is a de nite disadvantage to having your strategỳ found out' by the opponent. Using a probability vector to select randomly from among a number of possible strategies a ords protection from exactly such an occurrence. Strategies in this augmented sense are called mixed strategies (a term which should not be confused with the phenomenon of strategy mixing, which we introduce later). The strategies of the previous section are a special case of mixed strategies in which the probability distribution is a 1-point distribution, and are referred to as pure strategies.
Preliminarity and Anteriority
Let us consider again the extensive form of a game. If we represent a particular play of a game as a sequence of moves M 1 ; M 2 ; M 3 ; ; we can de ne the moves which are anterior to some personal move M k as being the sequence M 1 ; ; M k?1 . Notice that this property is transitive, i.e., if M is anterior to M and M is anterior to M , then M is anterior to M . We can also look at the amount of information on the outcome of the anterior moves that is available to the player who is called upon to make move M k . It is possible that this player will know which branch was chosen for each of the moves M 1 ; ; M k?1 , but it may also be that he has only partial knowledge, or no knowledge at all. The simplest way to describe a player's state of information at move M k is to form a set of preliminary moves, P. This set consists of the moves M i , for some i 2 f1; ; k ? 1g, such that the branch chosen for any of the M i 2 P is known to the player, but the exact choice made at any of the other anterior moves is not.
The class of games in which preliminarity and anteriority coincide (i.e., where a player called upon to make a move is informed about the outcome of all the anterior moves) is called perfect information games. We have already seen in x2.2 that the minimax theorem enables each player's optimal strategy to be interpreted in a precise way for such games. However, in games where anteriority does not imply preliminarity (which we call incomplete information games), peculiar features can result. For instance, the property of preliminarity need not be transitive, as illustrated by the following example, which we quote from von Neumann & Morgenstern 44, page 52]:
Poker: Let M be the deal of his`hand' to player 1|a chance move; M the rst bid of player 1|a personal move of 1; M the rst (subsequent) bid of player 2|a personal move of 2. Then M is preliminary to M and M to M but M is not preliminary to M (i.e., 1 makes his rst bid knowing his own`hand'; 2 makes his rst bid knowing 1's (preceding) rst bid; but at the same time 2 is ignorant of 1's`hand'.) This intransitivity of preliminarity involves both players, but it is also possible that preliminarity could be intransitive among the personal moves of one particular player. Bridge provides an example of this, since although it is played by four players, the rules of the game dictate that these players form two teams, which play against each other. Again using a description from von Neumann & Morgenstern 44, page 53]:
Bridge is a two-person game, but the two players 1 and 2 do not play it themselves. 1 acts through two representatives A and C and 2 through two representatives B and D. Consider now the representatives of 1, A and C. The rules of the game restrict communication, i.e., the exchange of information, between them. E.g.: let M be the deal of his`hand' to A | a chance move; M the rst card played by A | a personal move of 1; M the card played ...] by C | a personal move of 1. Then M is preliminary to M and M to M but M is not preliminary to M . Thus we again have intransitivity, but this time it involves only one player. Intransitivity of preliminarity raises the possibility of signalling (i.e., the spreading of information to other players). In Bridge, players who form one team but cannot see each other's cards will wish to promote this signalling, and an elaborate system of conventional signals has been developed to enable this. In Poker, the interest of a player lies in preventing this signalling, and this is usually achieved by irregular and seemingly illogical behaviour when making a choice. The rst of these two types of procedures is direct signalling and the second is inverted signalling.
Equilibrium Points in Bridge
With the de nitions of the previous section behind us, we can now formalise the particular problem that we address in this paper. Since our motivation is the study of Bridge as a game with incomplete information, we rst describe the game and its characteristics in more detail, and then present some simplifying assumptions that will aid analysis of the problem.
Bridge as a Game of Incomplete Information
Bridge is a card game played with a deck containing 52 cards, comprised of 4 suits (spades , hearts , diamonds }, and clubs |) each containing the 13 cards Ace, King, Queen, Jack, 10, ..., 2 (we will sometimes abbreviate the rst four of these to A, K, Q, and J). The game begins with the chance move of shu ing the deck, and the cards are then dealt between four players, traditionally named North, South, East and West. The players form two teams: North/South against East/West. Card play starts when one player lays a card on the table, which all the other players then cover in turn (in a clockwise direction) with a card from their own hand. Each round of four cards is called a trick, and the winner of one trick becomes the rst person to play a card on the succeeding round. For the purposes of this paper, the only signi cant rules are:
The rst player in a trick can freely choose which card to play from all those present in his hand. Subsequent players must play a card of the same suit as the one that started the trick, if they hold such a card | if they do not, they can make a free choice from among the remaining cards in their hand. The winner of the trick is the player who plays the highest card (ranked by A > K > Q > J > 10 > : : :> 2) of the suit led. The only exception to this when there is a suit declared as the trump suit; if any trump cards are played, then the player playing the highest trump card is the winner. In addition, play involves one player | the declarer | having complete control over two hands of cards, since his partner | the dummy | places his cards on the table for all to see, and then takes no further part in the proceedings.
Analysis of the game of Bridge is extraordinarily complicated. The shu ing and dealing of the pack of cards at the start of the game in e ect selects one of 52!=13! 4 possible positions for the subsequent play (the order of the cards in a hand does not matter | hence the dividing factors). Further, each player can initially see only their own hand, so (as we have already seen) preliminarity will be intransitive among the moves of the players, giving the opportunity for both direct signalling between partners, and inverted signalling to confuse the opponents. A related problem caused by this mis-match between the available information is that of predicting an opponent's beliefs. Korf, for example, although not motivated by considering games with incomplete information, examined the situation where two players have evaluation functions which are not known to the other Korf 89] . His description uses the common convention of naming the two players MAX and MIN. In the context of the previous section where we (arbitrarily) chose K 1 as the payo function, MAX will be player 1, since he tries to maximise the value of K 1 . Similarly, MIN will be player 2, since he tries to minimise the value. The decision process in a three-level MAX-MIN-MAX tree is described by Korf as follows:
MAX's decision will be based on what he thinks MIN will do. However, MIN's decision will be based on what he thinks MAX will do two levels down. Thus, MAX's decision is based on what MAX thinks that MIN thinks that MAX will do. Therefore, the evaluation function that is applied to each of the frontier nodes is MAX's model of MIN's model of MAX's evaluation function, and the nodes with the maximum values are backed up to the MAX nodes directly above the frontier. Next, MAX's model of MIN's evaluation is applied to the backed up nodes, and the nodes with the minimum values are backed up to the MIN nodes directly below the root. Finally, MAX's evaluation is applied to these backed up nodes to determine the nal move. In Bridge, then, we can identify the following four related complications over perfect information games. First, the intransitivity of preliminarity between the moves of the two sides will lead us to encounter the problem of ever-deepening levels of reasoning about the opposing side's beliefs.
Second, as we saw in x2.4, this intransitivity also makes inverted signalling possible, making it advantageous for one side to attempt to prevent the spread of information about their position to the other side. Third, there is the opportunity for direct signalling, in which the two players who form the opposition play to increase each other's information of their side's situation. Finally, since the absence of perfect information will entail solutions which are mixed strategies; there is an advantage to preventing the opponent from` nding out' your strategy.
The Reduced Form of an Incomplete Information Game
The problems outlined above present serious di culties when combined with game trees the size of those generated in Bridge (a lower bound of 1:05 10 18 can be established on the expected number of legal play sequences even when all the cards are revealed Frank & Basin 95] ). Thus, rather than tackling the actual game directly, we will make the following simplifying assumptions. A{I MIN has perfect information (i.e., preliminarity and anteriority coincide for MIN A{III The strategy adopted by MAX is a pure strategy (as de ned in x2.3). This enables us to search for the optimal strategy from among a nite (although possibly very large) set, in contrast to the set of possible mixed strategies. We will refer to the result of transforming any game by making these modi cations as its reduced form. It may seem that the assumptions are so severe that analysis of the reduced version will tell us very little about the original game. However, we can justify the transformation by noting that, at least in the context of Bridge, it is very commonto see this reduced form of the game implicitlyused in expert texts, which often analyse play problems under exactly the assumptions given formally above. For any given example, such texts typically start by selecting a small number of promising strategies. For each of these strategies, its chance of success is then found by enumerating the possible card distributions and analysing the return produced when the opponents are allowed to choose their best strategy in each perfect information situation. The Bridge Encyclopaedia ACBL 94], for example, devotes 56 pages to presenting the best strategies (with percentage chances of success) for di erent card combinations, all of which are analysed in this way. Notice that such an analysis is precisely the situation modelled by the assumptions A-I and A-II: rst MAX picks a strategy, and then a MIN with perfect information about the outcome of all prior chance moves is allowed to select the best response. This kind of MIN opponent is one which knows the way in which MAX plays, and will always use this knowledge to be ready with the best possible response to MAX's actions in any world.
Under the assumptions A-I and A-II, the optimal strategies for MAX will in general be mixed strategies, since this will a ord some degree of protection from his actual moves being completely predicted by MIN. However, many Bridge books, including the Bridge Encyclopaedia, restrict their consideration to pure strategies as solutions to these situations. This restriction may either be motivated by a desire to make the game easier to analyse (as in our case above), or may simply be an error of oversight. Whatever the reason, such books typically refer to this as choosing the best strategy`against best opposition' or`against best defence', and the formulation is presumably popular because the payo that can be obtained against the strongest opposition can be treated as a kind of lower bound on the payo which can be expected when the opponents are less accomplished. Moreover, we are not aware of any way of analysing the actual game, with all the inherent di culties identi ed in the previous sections. We will therefore follow the tradition of using an analysis of the reduced version to produce useful insights into the actual game itself.
Solving the Reduced Form
What does it mean to solve the reduced form of an incomplete information game? One of the main di erences between the reduced form and the actual game is that MIN chooses his strategy after MAX. This makes the reduced form similar to the minorant form of a perfect information game, for which, as we saw in x2.2, the value to be expected by MAX (player 1) is:
For the minorant game, min x2 K 1 (x 1 ; x 2 ) is a function of x 1 , so it is easily maximised. In our reduced form, however, there is a complication. MIN (player 2) now has perfect information. He therefore always knows his current position in the game tree, and for any choice of x 1 by MAX he can select an optimal x 2 .
MAX, however, is not party to the same information as MIN, so he will be unable to directly identify whether any x 2 will be optimal for MIN. Speci cally, since he does not have perfect information, there may be moves in the game for which MIN knows the outcome, but MAX does not. Selection of an optimal x 2 will require knowledge of the outcome of these moves. In the following section we will introduce an algorithm which deals with this problem by identifying (possibly different) choices of x 2 which are optimal under each of the possible outcomes of these moves. After, we discuss the implications of this for games with incomplete information in general, and also more speci cally for some algorithms which have been proposed for the game of Bridge.
Exhaustive Strategy Minimisation
The algorithm we propose comes from directly computing (4): we enumerate all strategies x 1 for player 1 (MAX) and for each of them we separately and exhaustively evaluate min x2 K 1 (x 1 ; x 2 ) by examining each possible x 2 under each possible outcomes of the chance moves. Since this carries out a minimisation operation for each MAX strategy, we call the algorithm exhaustive strategy minimisation.
The Algorithm
Assume that for t a tree, node(t) returns its root node and sub(t) computes the set of immediate subtrees of node(t). Figure 2 then de nes exhaustive strategy minimisation. Note that this algorithm is very simply de ned to directly compute (4). It is therefore not necessarily the best implementation in terms of e ciency | an issue we will discuss in more detail in x4.5. The assumptions involved in modifying a game into its reduced form are central to the correctness of this algorithm. Firstly, to be able to actually form the set of MAX strategies, S, assumption A{III restricting consideration to pure strategies is needed. Secondly, in xing a particular s j 2 S and calling esm(t; s j ), assumption A-II that MIN selects his strategy after MAX is required. Finally, assumption A-I (that MIN has Algorithm esm(?): Returns optimal strategies for player 1 (MAX) in the reduced, extensive form, 2-player game ?
Form the set of player 1's strategies, S, as q-tuples in which the ith entry represents the branch that is chosen at all nodes, n, for which I 1 (n) = i.
For each s j 2 S, calculate E j = esm(t; s j ).
Return the strategy (or strategies) s j for which E j is maximum.
where, esm(t; s) takes the following actions, depending on t.
Condition
Result t is leaf node K 1 (t) P(node(t)) is 2 (i.e., MIN to move) min ti2sub(t) esm(t i ; s) P(node(t)) is 1 (i.e., MAX to move) esm(t i ; s), where i is the I 1 (node(t))th element of s.
P(node(t)) is 0 (i.e., chance move)
(node(t i )) esm(t i ; s)
Figure 2: The exhaustive strategy minimisation algorithm perfect information) is used at chance and MIN nodes, since it is only valid to assume that the evaluation of a particular node depends just on the subtree of that node if there is no ambiguity over the position in the tree. Under these assumptions, it follows by induction on the height of game trees t, that for any strategy s for MAX, esm(t; s) computes the minimal payo to which MAX can be restricted by MIN. Therefore, given the top-level maximisation loop, the algorithm returns the optimal strategy for MAX and thus correctly computes (4).
An Example
To illustrate this algorithm, we will consider again the example of Figure 1 . Let us interpret this diagram under the common convention that nodes where it is MAX's turn to move are represented as squares, and those where it is MIN's turn are represented as circles. MAX therefore has two information sets, with two possible moves in each, allowing him four strategies. These strategies can be identi ed by the tuples (1,1), (1,2), (2,1), and (2,2). Let us assume that the`lower' of the information sets in Figure 1 is the set`1', and the`upper' is the set`2': the rst of the tuples above then corresponds to selecting the left-hand branch at every MAX node; the second corresponds to choosing the left-hand branch at all the MAX nodes in the lower set and the right-hand branch in the`upper' set, and so on. In (4), the result of each of MAX's possible strategies is found by minimising over all the possible responses by MIN. The esm(?) algorithm models this by calculating esm(t; s) for each possible MAX strategy, s. Let us consider how this will function for the strategy (1,1). The original call to the esm(t; s) algorithm will examine the root of the tree, nd it to be a chance node, and make recursive calls on each of the subtrees. Each of these subtrees has a MIN node at the root, so further recursive calls will then be made on each of their subtrees. The roots of these trees are now MAX nodes, so the branch to select is recovered from the strategy under consideration, and found to be branch 1. Further recursive calls on the subtrees along these branches encounter leaf nodes, at which point the payo s are returned. These payo s are then passed back up the tree. At the MIN nodes, the minimum of the subtree evaluations is returned. This process is depicted in Figure 3 , which shows that the strategy (1,1) will lead to a payo of 0 under each outcome of the chance move except the third. If the outcomes of this move are all equally likely, then, the evaluation of this strategy is 1=5. Examining the remaining strategies in the same way shows that the strategy (1,2) leads to a payo of 1 in just the rst two of the outcomes of the chance move, strategy (2,1) leads to a payo of 1 in just the nal two outcomes, and strategy (2,2) always produces a payo of 0. The two strategies which maximise (4) are therefore (1,2) and (2,1), if we assume equally likely outcomes for the chance move.
Comparison with Standard Minimaxing
The exhaustive strategy minimisation algorithm should not be confused with minimaxing, which correctly produces the game-theoretic value of any nite tree in which the players have perfect information. For comparison, in Figure 4 we give a formalisation of the minimax algorithm on games in extensive form.
Algorithm mm(?): Take the following actions, depending on t. Notice that where the esm(?) algorithm explicitly manipulates strategies by passing them as arguments and analysing them, the mm(?) algorithm builds a MAX strategy for each of the possible outcomes of the chance moves by determining a course of action for each MAX node on the basis of the subtree with the largest minimax value. It should be clear that this approach will always produce an evaluation which is greater than or equal to the maximum E j produced by the esm(?) algorithm. To see this, consider any MAX node (the only node at which the actions of the mm(?) and esm(?) algorithms di er substantially). At these nodes, the mm(?) algorithm selects the maximum subtree value to back up through the tree, whereas the esm(t; s j ) algorithm must select the branch determined by s j . The evaluation produced by the mm(?) algorithm can therefore never be less than that produced by esm(?). The di erences between the two algorithms can be summarised as follows: mm(?) does not respect the constraint imposed by information sets. That is, it does not always choose the same branch at the nodes which belong to the same information set. Since mm(?) commits to one branch selection at each MAX node, it risks incompleteness.
In x6 and x7 we show that these di erences cause di culties in games with incomplete information. Speci cally, we will show that the rst leads to the problem of strategy mixing, and the second leads to the phenomenon of non-locality.
Possible Worlds
The tree of Figure 1 contains just one chance node, and this node is located at the root. Let us say that in a tree which contains chance nodes, each possible pure strategy for player 0 (chance) de nes a world state, or more simply a world, in which the play takes place. Consider the special case of a tree which contains just one chance node, and where that chance node occurs at the root of the tree. If, with the exception of the payo s and the MIN information sets, the subtrees in each possible world are identical, we will say that the tree can be` attened' by representing the possible worlds in the vertical dimension as di ering payo s at the leaf nodes, rather than in the horizontal dimension using information sets. For example, Figure 5 shows how the tree of Figure 1 can be represented if we refer to the possible outcomes (left to right) of the initial chance move as the worlds w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 , and w 5 . We will use such trees in the remainder of this paper to compactly and simply present game trees. Notice that the MIN nodes are the result of identifying together nodes with distinct information sets, and that a MIN strategy must therefore allow di erent branch choices under each world. A MAX strategy, on the other hand, must specify the branches to be chosen at each MAX node under all worlds.
Note that game trees in Bridge cannot in fact be represented in this way, even though they will always have just one chance move at the top of the tree. This chance move will determine a world, but the possible plays under each of these worlds will not in general be the same. For example, MAX will only be able to play a given card, such as the A , in worlds where he was actually dealt the card to begin with. Thus, the subtrees in each world are di erent and cannot be` attened' as described above. The applicability of the esm(?) algorithm, of course, is una ected.
The Complexity of Exhaustive Strategy Minimisation
Exhaustive strategy minimisation, while identifying optimal strategies, is not cheap: its complexity is signi cantly worse than conventional minimaxing. To investigate this, we rst examine how the set of possible MAX strategies, S, may be generated. We do this by looking at the type of attened trees we introduced in the previous section, using the complete binary tree of Figure 6 as an example. Here, we have numbered the MAX nodes in the order in which they would be encountered during a pre-order traversal of the tree. We will use this numbering to construct 5-tuples which correspond to the possible strategies in the game by virtue of the ith element representing the choice to be made at the node numbered i (e ectively, the ith information set). To examine how this set of 5-tuples may be generated, let us consider MAX's possible branch selections. In the strategies where MAX initially selects the left-hand branch at the root of the tree, play is directed to the left-hand MIN node. Since we do not know which branch will be selected at this node, we must now specify branch selections throughout both its subtrees. Continuing to examine the left-most branch rst, we encounter MAX node 2 and then MAX node 3, where we will assume that we initially again select the left-hand branch. This detail has been glossed over until now, but it should be clear that by selecting the left-hand branches at these two nodes, we will in fact complete a strategy for the game; once the left-hand branch has been selected at the root of the tree, it is no longer necessary to specify branch selections for nodes 4 and 5. We will indicate such super uous branch selections by an underscore. The strategy we have generated by always selecting the left-most branch, then, is (1,1,1, , ) ; overall, the set of possible strategies is:
Left-hand branch at root Right-hand branch at root (1,1,1, , ) (2, , ,1,1) (1,2,1, , ) (2, , ,2,1) (1,1,2, , ) (2, , ,1,2) (1,2,2, , ) (2, , ,2,2) In general trees, the number of actual strategies in a game is bounded by the number of possible n-tuples. As we have seen above, when encountering a MAX node, any one of the branches may be selected. However, at nodes which are moves of another player, MAX will have to cater for all of the possible branches that may be chosen. Thus, for a given tree, t, the total number of strategies g(t) is given by the following:
g(t i ) if MAX is to move at the root of t Y ti2sub(t) g(t i ) if another player is to move at the root node of t
if t is a leaf node
For complete b-ary trees which alternate between the moves of MAX and MIN this formula can be written as a standard recurrence relation. As the addition of an extra layer of MIN nodes to the leaves of a tree does not alter the number of MAX strategies present, we will write this recurrence as a function of the number of MAX levels, n, in a tree. For a b-ary tree with a MAX node at the root, then, we can write the number of MAX strategies, g n , as For b-ary trees in general, then, the number of strategies that must be examined is doubly exponential in the number of MAX levels which the tree contains. Further, all of these strategies are examined in each of the possible worlds. Thus, the exhaustive strategy minimisation algorithm will require too much computation to be applied to all but the smallest of game trees. However, note that this is an upper bound to the complexity of this problem. We do not know if there is a more e cient way of nding the optimal strategy; however, as we will show in the following sections, minimaxing, and algorithms based on it, are not a substitute.
Bridge Architectures Based on Standard Minimaxing
In the remainder of this paper we use the above framework to analyse the game of Bridge and in particular to examine the technique, mentioned in the introduction, of simplifying the task of card play by solving instead the easier problem where all the players reveal their cards to each other. Since the perfect knowledge situation created by this act is akin to the opponents placing their cards on the table in the same manner as dummy, this scenario is often described as double-dummy Bridge. Below, we present the double-dummy architectures proposed by both Levy and Ginsberg Levy 89, Ginsberg 95] . After, we will use our framework to suggest that this approach cannot scaleup to produce expert play in actual Bridge, and to formalise two general problems that can a ict search algorithms in games with incomplete information.
A Million Pound Bridge Program?
The rst person to explicitly propose the use of a double-dummy solver as the basis for a program to play Bridge appears to have been Levy Levy 89] . He was con dent that this kind of program could win the prize of 1 million pounds o ered by former Bridge World Champion, Zia Mahmood, to the designers of a computer player that could defeat him. Here, we describe Levy's algorithm by considering the general problem of selecting MAX's next move in an arbitrary incomplete information game.
Let us say that, for some move under consideration, the set of worlds which are consistent with the outcomes of the previous (preliminary) moves is given by W. Let us also say that it is possible to choose an n such that when we randomly generate n members, w 1 ; ; w n of W, we have su cient computing resources to nd the minimax value of the current (complete information) game tree under each of these worlds. If there are m possible moves, M 1 ; ; M m , to choose between and we use e ij to denote the minimax value of the ith possible move under world w j , the situation in this world will be as depicted in Figure 7 . Selecting a move is achieved by actually using the minimax algorithm to generate the values of the e ij s, and determining the M i for which the value of f(M i ) is greatest. Since this technique relies on repeated applications of the minimax algorithm to problems with perfect information, we will refer to it as repeated minimaxing, and to the limiting case where every possible world is examined as exhaustive minimaxing.
Mi Mm
Of course, other possible de nitions for the scoring function f can be envisaged, and indeed Ginsberg's notion of selecting`the play that works best on average ' Ginsberg 95] = is an in x function which equals 1 if both sides are equal, and 0 otherwise (that is, a move is given a score of 1 for each world in which it is the best, or equal best, alternative). Another possibility (particularly in Bridge, where the objective is usually to win at least a certain number of tricks) is to only consider moves which guarantee a result at least as large as some minimum value, e, say. That is:
> e e ij prob(w j ) :
However, more important than the choice of the scoring function in our current context is the answer to the more fundamental question of whether Levy is justi ed in speculating that this kind of architecture is the key to playing the cards`perfectly' (Levy's quotes). Below we show that no possible scoring function can work optimally.
Repeated Minimaxing Fails: Strategy Mixing
The repeated minimaxing architecture described above is based on looking at a representative sample of possible distributions of outstanding cards and using them to evaluate the best strategy. We use the framework we developed in x3 to show that this is not possible, i.e., suboptimal strategies may be returned. Indeed, we show that even an exhaustive minimaxing algorithm, examining all the possible distributions, may fail to select the correct strategy! Although our discussion is driven by the problems experienced by repeated minimaxing, we also show that any algorithm which shares speci c characteristics with minimaxing will experience the same di culties. We use examples from Bridge to show how such sub-optimal algorithms lead to improper play in real games.
Let us return to the attened version of the game tree we rst introduced in x2, this time labelling picks the left-hand branch at node d, he will encounter the tree with four possible strategies that we have already examined in x4. Alternatively, he may select the right-hand branch, which leads to a subtree in which no further MAX choices are necessary. Thus, the extra branch increases the number of possible MAX strategies by one. Since we have already seen that none of the strategies in the left-hand subtree give a payo of 1 in more than two worlds, MAX's best option at the root of the tree, guaranteeing a return of 1 under every world, is to select the right-hand branch.
However, using the standard minimax algorithm under any single world, the two MIN nodes a and e will always have a minimax value of 1 (since in any single world MAX can always choose a branch with a payo of 1 at nodes b, c and f). Applying repeated minimaxing to the root of the tree then, irrespective of the scoring function used, must assign both the left-hand branch and the right-hand branch the same score! Thus, repeated minimaxing will perform no better than making a random choice between the two moves, even in the limiting case of exhaustive minimaxing. Furthermore, reducing the number of worlds in which the right-hand branch gives a payo of 1 can produce situations in which repeated minimaxing will usually select the incorrect move, and indeed where exhaustive minimaxing will always select incorrectly. For example, consider how exhaustive minimaxing behaves in the situation of Figure 9(a) , where the payo s on the right-hand branch have been modi ed so that a payo of 1 is achieved in only three worlds. Despite this modi cation, this branch still represents MAX's best move at the root of the tree, under the assumption that all the worlds are equally likely. For exhaustive minimaxing, however, it is the other branch that will be selected by any of the scoring functions of x5, as the left-hand MIN node has a minimax value of 1 in all ve worlds, whereas the right-hand node has a value of 1 in just three. (Repeated minimaxing may pick the correct branch, but only if it does not examine either of the worlds w 1 and w 2 and then makes a fortunate guess). Any sensible scoring function will never lead exhaustive minimaxing to select the right-hand branch in this situation, as it clearly cannot be rational behaviour, given a set of alternatives to choose between, to prefer an option whose evaluation is always less than or equal to that of one the others. To see that no possible scoring function can cope with all such situations, consider Figure 9 (b). To an exhaustive minimaxing algorithm, this tree will be indistinguishable from that of Figure 9 (a), as the minimax values of the MIN nodes in each are the same under every world. However, in Figure 9 (a) the best move is the right-hand branch, and in Figure 9 (b) the best move is the left-hand branch. Any given scoring function will therefore either make the correct choice in just one of these situations or will be unable to distinguish the best move in either case. The source of the di culty which repeated minimaxing experiences on these trees lies in a crucial deviation it makes from the exhaustive strategy minimisation algorithm we presented in x4. Recall that for each world that it considers, exhaustive strategy minimisation examines the result of every possible strategy. Repeated minimaxing, on the other hand, uses the minimax algorithm to nd the best strategy in a number of worlds. As we pointed out in x4.3, using minimaxing in this way does not respect the constraint imposed by information sets: it allows di erent strategies to be chosen in di erent worlds. Collecting the minimax values of these strategies and assuming that they represent the payo s that can be expected under each world ignores the fact that a choice of a particular strategy has to be made. We therefore call this problem strategy mixing. As we saw in x4.3, allowing the minimax algorithm to ignore the constraint imposed by information sets results in evaluations greater than or equal to the correct values (e.g., produced by exhaustive strategy minimisation). Repeated minimaxing will therefore have the tendency to over-estimate its scoring of any node; the strategy mixing e ect leads it to believe that it has the luxury of choosing a di erent strategy in each world, instead of the best single strategy across all worlds. For example, given perfect information at node b or node c it is easy to determine which branch to select to produce a payo of 1. Node a will therefore always have a minimax value of 1 under repeated minimaxing. However, we have already seen that when a single strategy selection is enforced, the best that can be achieved is a payo of 1 in at most two worlds.
Another way to visualise the strategy mixing problem is to note that the repeated minimaxing architecture actually models the task of selecting between some number of perfect information games each starting with the same chance move. For example, imagine that the subtrees rooted on nodes a and e in Figure 8 represent the MIN and MAX moves in a game starting with a chance move that selects one of the possible worlds w 1 ; ; w 5 . Which of these games would we rather play given that they have perfect information (for both players)? This is the question which exhaustive minimaxing answers, and to which repeated minimaxing approximates. It should be clear that such an algorithm will always expect to win the game based on the tree of node a and the game based on the tree of node e. It should also be clear that the situation modelled by this algorithm is di erent from the original game as well from the model produced by our assumptions about a reduced game, since it involves assumptions about MAX, as well as MIN, having perfect information.
A Bridge Example
To see an example of strategy mixing in the game of Bridge, consider the situation of Figure 10 , where we control both the North and the South hands against two opponents who see just their own hand and the North hand, which is the dummy. Assume that spades are trumps | recall that cards in the trump suit beat cards in every other suit | and that it is South's turn to play. We are worried about the last outstanding trump (the 2 ) but cannot force the opposition to play this card by leading the A because currently it is not North's turn to play, and South has no cards in the suit. However, whichever opponent has the last trump must also have at least one diamond or one club. Since players must always follow the suit of the card which starts a trick, it is therefore possible to win all the remaining tricks by leading the suit which the opponent with the last trump holds, winning in the North hand with the Ace of that suit, and then clearing the trumps with the A . In reality, this choice between leading a diamond or a club is a guess, but a double-dummy program will nd that it is always possible because it has perfect knowledge of every world. A Bridge situation where repeated minimaxing is misled by strategy mixing can therefore be constructed by adding four cards to the above situation, as in Figure 11 . In this new situation, let us assume that the lead is now in the North hand, so that there are four possible moves: the lead of the Ace of any suit. Choosing either of the diamond or the club suits will be (correctly) evaluated by a repeated minimaxing algorithm as less than 100% plays, provided the algorithm examines at least one world in which the Ace may lose to a trump played by an opponent. Choosing the spade suit, on the other hand, will be (correctly) evaluated as a 100% play, since after the A is played there will be no remaining trumps and North's other Aces will be guaranteed winners. However, exhaustive minimaxing will also assess the Ace of hearts to be a 100% play. This is because a trump can be played on this card from the South hand (winning the trick) and then the North hand re-entered by making a guess between diamonds and clubs as described above. This play, of course, is clearly not guaranteed to succeed, as would be revealed by an algorithm such as exhaustive strategy minimisation, which would separately evaluate the strategies of re-entering the North hand with a club or with a diamond, nding that they would each lose under some of the possible worlds.
Some Practical Consequences
To our knowledge, the concept of strategy mixing has not been formalised before. However, some of the e ects of strategy mixing have been discussed in the literature on computer Bridge, although they have typically been mis-analysed. Ginsberg, for instance, presents the card combination of Figure 12 (where we control both the North and the South hands, an`x' represents an arbitrary low card, and we are only concerned with the cards in this suit).
The essence of this situation is that if the location of the missing Queen is known, it will always be possible to win four tricks. To see this, consider what happens if we know that West holds the Queen. We start by playing a low card from the South hand, and if West plays the Queen we win with the King and cash the remaining top cards. If West chooses not to play the Queen, we win with the Jack or the Ten (this play is called a nesse), and repeat the same procedure on the following trick. Similarly, we can always win the trick if we know that East holds the Queen, this time by leading low from the North hand. In practice, the location of the Queen is unknown and must be guessed; a wrong guess will allow the Queen to defeat the nesse. However, a double-dummy program will always see the position of the cards and`know' which opponent to play for the card. Ginsberg correctly realises this problem, pointing out that a double-dummy program will`assume that it can always play KJ10x opposite A98x for no losers'. However, he also suggests that such an algorithm`won't mind playing this suit by starting with the 9 (for example)', whereas human players`might play the Ace rst to cater to a singleton Queen on our right'. To see why this is not the whole story, consider a game tree composed of just the node b in Figure 13 . We have already seen that under any single world the minimax value of node b is always 1, and that such nodes can lead to strategy mixing. However, consider this new situation where the node is at the root of the tree of possibilities. If we use repeated minimaxing to analyse this tree, the best move is found by determining the branch that has the highest score under some function f. This separate examination of each branch removes the freedom to select the best strategy for each world, and since neither of these branches alone can guarantee a payo of 1 under every world, there must now be a payo of 0 in some worlds. In e ect, then, node b represents a point where a choice between strategies which win under di erent worlds has to be made. If such a decision point occurs within a game tree, as in Figure 8 , a repeated minimaxing algorithm will deceive itself into thinking that it can always make the correct choice. If the decision point occurs at the root of the tree as in Figure 13 , however, some of the freedom to choose di erent strategies in di erent worlds is lost. A repeated minimaxing algorithm will therefore have a tendency to delay such decision points wherever possible, as`doing it later' will always appear to be better than`doing it now'. Only when it actually reaches a point where a choice has to be made will it realise that its previous evaluations were in ated by the e ects of strategy mixing.
To see how this is relevant in Ginsberg's example, observe that in order to be able to always win the nesse against either East or West for the outstanding Queen it is necessary to retain both the Ace and the King. Starting a trick by actually playing either of these cards, then, will remove this ability, making it impossible to win all the tricks in the suit under every world. Repeated minimaxing will therefore correctly evaluate the play of the Ace or the King at less than 100% if it selects any of these worlds to examine. The play of any other card in the suit, however, leaves the ability to nesse against either opponent intact, always resulting in an (over-estimated) evaluation of 100%. Therefore, it is not that a repeated minimaxing is indi erent over the card to lead in the suit, as Ginsberg suggests, but rather that it will prefer to play one of the J, 10, 9, 8, x. Indeed, an exhaustive minimaxing will only choose to play these cards.
Sometimes the delaying of a crucial decision can be important, as the later an actual choice is made, the more information there is likely to be to inform the decision. For example, consider the situation in Figure 14 , where the aim is to win all the tricks and there is no trump suit. The spade suit is identical to that of Ginsberg's example, so there is again a guess over the position of the Queen. However, this is not necessarily a complete guess. As Frank Frank 89, Page 207] points out in a similar example,`by playing out the winners in the other three suits, information will be gained which will increase one's chance of making the right play, possibly up to certainty'. It might be hoped that the tendency of a repeated minimaxing algorithm to delay such decisions would result in this discovery play being made. However, as we have already seen, although the Ace and King are less than 100% plays, the lower cards in the suit are not, so a repeated minimaxing algorithm may well choose to play the spade suit early.
7 Non-locality (Repeated Minimaxing Fails Again)
The failure of minimax-like algorithms we address here is more subtle than that of strategy mixing and, to our knowledge, has not been studied before. To illustrate it, we will refer once more to the attened version of the tree introduced in x2, which we repeat here for ease of reference.
When actually playing the game represented by this tree, MAX will only ever have to make one decision: the selection of a move at either node b or node c (e ectively, one choice for each of the information sets in the game). Let us again assume equally likely worlds. Irrespective of the MAX node at which the play arrives after MIN's move at the root of the tree, repeated minimaxing, using any of the scoring functions from x5, will usually select the left-hand branch (in the limiting case of exhaustive minimaxing, the left-hand branch will always be chosen). Thus, the strategy that will typically be chosen by repeated minimaxing, and indeed the one that will always be selected by exhaustive minimaxing will be the one we have identi ed as (1,1). However, we have already seen in x4 that under the assumption of equally likely worlds, the best strategy selections are actually (1,2) and (2,1)! The problem here is distinct from that of strategy mixing, and can be traced to a di erent cause: the way in which a branch selection is made at a node on the basis of an evaluation only of its direct subtree. The inherent assumption in making a branch selection in this way is that the correct move is a function only of the possible continuations of the game. In perfect information situations (i.e., where the position in the game tree is known), this assumption is justi ed and the minimax algorithm, with its compositional evaluation function, nds optimal strategies for such games. With more than one possible world, however, this assumption is no longer valid. The reason for this is that a decision procedure making this assumption considers only partial strategies at any internal node of a tree: the actual strategies themselves would have to specify further choices at other MAX nodes in the tree. This is the manifestation of the incompleteness we alluded to in x4.3.
To illustrate the discussion here, let us return to the task of selecting a strategy in our example tree. If we just analyse the subtree of node b, we see that the left-hand branch appears to be the best choice because it produces a payo of 1 in three out of the ve possible worlds. In the context of the entire game, however, selecting the left-hand branch at node b a ects the analysis of node c.
Since the left-hand branch at node b produces payo s of 0 in worlds w 4 and w 5 , MIN (who chooses his strategy after MAX and has knowledge of the state of the world) will be able to restrict MAX's payo to 0 in these worlds irrespective of MAX's choice at node c. Under this circumstance, it is the right-hand branch that is the best choice at node c, since it o ers a payo of 1 in two worlds (w 1 and w 2 ), compared to the single payo of 1 (in world w 3 ) o ered by the left-hand branch. Similarly, if we consider making a branch selection at node b after choosing a branch at node c, we nd that the best selection is no longer the one which leads to a payo of 1 in most worlds.
In general, the choice of branch at a given MAX node is not simply a function of the payo s of the paths which contain the MAX node, but of the payo s along any path in the tree. If MIN can choose a play at a node's ancestor which reduces the payo (in any world) from that which MAX would expect from examining the MAX node's direct subtree, the best choice of branch at that node may change. For example, in the case of Figure 16 , the initial selection of branch a may be rendered incorrect if reducing some of the e ia can result in the maximum value of the function f being achieved at a di erent branch. Figure 16 : A search process in which the selection of branch a may be rendered incorrect by nonlocality
We call this problem of having to consider all other nodes in the tree non-locality. To see that no possible scoring function can cope with the e ects of non-locality, consider the examples of Figure 17 . The left-hand MAX node is the same in both trees, and leads to a payo of 1 in just one of the two worlds. However, in one tree the best choice is the left-hand branch and in the other it is the right (since against a MIN player who knows the actual state of the world, the other strategies in each tree always give a payo of 0). No algorithm analysing these MAX nodes in isolation will be able to make the correct selection in both situations. Unlike strategy mixing, which is linked with incorrect assumptions about MAX having perfect knowledge, it should be clear that non-locality is closely related to the presence of di ering levels of information between the players of the game. MIN's ability to lead the play away from a given node under certain worlds by selecting branches higher in the tree relies both on his ability to choose a strategy after MAX (assumption A{II in our reduced form), and knowledge of the actual state of the world (which in reduced games is complete knowledge, from assumption A-I). Under these conditions, it will generally bene t MAX to select mixed strategies rather than pure ones, since this will help prevent his actual moves from being known by MIN. The main limitation of our model is therefore that it restricts consideration to pure strategies. In our case, this restriction was imposed to aid formal analysis, allowing the esm(?) algorithm to be speci ed using a simple loop. However, as we noted in x3.2, pure strategies are also often given as solutions in standard Bridge texts, and we can further justify this restriction by pointing out that the repeated minimaxing model, in its present form, is also incapable of producing mixed strategies.
We should emphasise that since non-locality occurs as a consequence of (the interaction between the assumptions of the reduced form and) the implicit assumption that the best choice at a node can be determined by analysing just the node's subtree, the phenomenon will be independent of the accuracy of the evaluations on which the branch selection is based. For example, in Figure 16 , nonlocality would still be possible whether the e's were produced using repeated minimaxing (risking incorrect values caused by strategy mixing) or by using exhaustive strategy minimisation to nd the results of the optimal strategy for the subtree (therefore producing exact values). Thus, the solution to improving the double-dummy architectures of Levy and Ginsberg does not lie with the simple replacement of the minimax algorithm with modi ed versions, such as average propagation Nau et al 88] or product propagation Pearl 81, Pearl 83]. The back-up rules in such algorithms, when calculating a value to propagate up the tree, take into account the value of each subtree at a node. Their use in the repeated minimaxing algorithm may therefore reduce the e ects of strategy mixing, but non-locality will still be present. Also, the very property that each node contributes to the result in such algorithms means that search enhancement techniques such as alpha-beta pruning cannot be used to improve e ciency without a ecting the values computed.
Currently, we are aware of no correct algorithm for identifying optimal strategies in reduced games other than the exhaustive minimaxing algorithm of x4. This algorithm overcomes both the phenomena of non-locality and strategy mixing by the simple expedient of examining the possible outcomes of each complete strategy separately.
A Bridge Example
We give below an example of non-locality as it can occur in Bridge. Note that it is di cult to construct simple examples for the non-specialist in Bridge. The example below is, however, representative of the kinds of problems that can arise during actual play. Consider the situation of Figure 18 , where one trick must be lost as the highest remaining card is held by the opposition. For ease of exposition we will assume that the possible options are represented using a slightly higher-level representation: rather than selecting between possible moves, we will examine applicable tactics Frank et al 92, Frank 91] , which are operators that specify not just a card to lead on a trick, but also the card to played by the declarer from the third hand, after the rst opponent has responded.
1
We will look at the two tactics which succeed under most worlds. The rst of these is a play which begins by leading the 7 from the North hand. If East plays the Queen straight away, declarer 1 Note that Ginsberg suggests a similar representation when discussing the example of Figure 12 . When leading a card, he proposes that declarer should`decide in advance' the other card he will play on the trick | essentially creating tactics. Within the repeated minimaxing framework, such a representation change has the e ect of delaying the onset of strategy mixing for one level of search, since instead of choosing between individual moves | which are really just partial strategies with only the rst step determined | we are now choosing between options which are partial strategies with the rst two steps determined. However, the strategy mixing which results from allowing di erent completions of these partial strategies in di erent worlds will still remain beyond this new horizon. Although the use of tactics can indeed`correct' the problems caused by strategy mixing in Ginsberg's example, then, it cannot provide a complete solution unless the`tactics' extend to the end of the play, at which point they become complete strategies. Outstanding: Q 9 5 Figure 18 : A Bridge card combination where one trick must be lost plays a low card from the South hand and wins the next two tricks with the Jack and the 10. If East plays the 9, declarer covers with the 10 and is again guaranteed two tricks. Finally, if East plays low, declarer again plays a low card from the South hand, hoping to nd that East holds the 9, thus either forcing out the Queen or winning the trick outright. This play is a particular type of nesse (of the 7) against East. The other possibility we will examine is a di erent type of nesse, this time of the Jack, against West. This play begins by leading a low card from the South hand, intending to play the Jack unless West plays the Queen. Of the eight possible ways to split the outstanding cards, the distributions under which each of these tactics would produce two tricks are shown in Table 19 . With no further information to guide a choice, then, the most promising of the two tactics appears to be the nesse of the Jack. This will fail to win two tricks in only one of the eight possible worlds (which is also the least likely), whereas the nesse of the 7 will fail in two. However, notice that the situation of Figure 18 can in fact be reached in one round of play (each player contributing one card) from the state where the cards are initially distributed as in Figure 20 .
If MAX does not know the actual distribution of the outstanding cards, his best play in this situation is to lead the 6 from the North hand and play low from the South hand unless East plays the 9 or one of the King or Queen. Faced with this play, East's best option if he holds the cards shown is to play low with the 5. If he does this, West will win the trick with the 9 and the declarer will be restricted to just two tricks in the suit. Similarly, if East starts with Kx or Qx, the best option will again be to play low. Thus, if the situation of Figure 18 is encountered as the result of leading the 6 and having to beat the King with the Ace, there will be extra information about the lie of the cards. Speci cally, the cases where East holds the Q5 or the singleton 5 can be ruled out, because under these circumstances another branch, higher in the tree, would have been chosen by East to restrict the declarer to just two tricks. This extra information would have a crucial e ect on the situation in Figure 18 . If it was known that this position would not be reached under the two distributions where East holds the Q5 or the 5, we can see from Figure 19 that the nesse of the 7 would then succeed under all the remaining worlds, whereas the nesse of the Jack would still fail in one. The probability of the nesse of the 7 producing two tricks in this scenario would therefore be higher than that of the nesse of the J, and the selection made in this position would need to be reversed.
Conclusions
We have looked at the problem of selecting a strategy in zero-sum two-player games with incomplete information. We formalised the notion of a reduced form of such games in which equilibrium point strategies could be more easily identi ed, and presented exhaustive strategy minimisation as an algorithm capable of nding such strategies.
Although the problems we address seem central to the design of programs for playing games in incomplete information domains, it appears that they have not been adequately studied or addressed in the literature. We were therefore able to newly formalise two general problems which can result from the incorrect handling of the technical notion of a strategy in such domains. The rst of these, strategy mixing, results from combining di erent MAX strategies in di erent possible worlds. The second, non-locality, results from examining only partial strategies at internal nodes of a game tree.
We demonstrated that both strategy mixing and non-locality are present when the standard minimax algorithm is applied to games with incomplete information, as in the repeated minimaxing architecture. In the domain of Bridge, where we showed that the reduced form of the game corresponds to the typical model analysed in expert texts, our results must therefore call into question some of the claims about the prospects of computer players based on fast double-dummy programs. For instance, it seems at best unproven that such programs will inevitably mean that, as humans, our time as world Bridge champions is limited ' Ginsberg 95] .
We pointed out that the main limitation of our model is the restriction to pure, rather than the general case of mixed, strategies. Also, our solution of exhaustive strategy minimisation, although capable of producing optimal strategies, is highly intractable. This suggests that there is a real cost involved in overcoming the e ects of incomplete information. However, we have not yet established a lower bound for the complexity of this problem, and this remains an open | and apparently important | problem for the design of programs which play games like Bridge.
